

OSCE MECHANISMS AND PROCEDURES

This document provides a brief summary of the main mechanisms and procedures available within the OSCE with regard to early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management. It attempts to interpret these mechanisms in view of the institutional development of the Organization, including changes in institutions and structures that have occurred over the years, in particular the establishment of the Permanent Council (PC) in 1995 and the abolishment of the Senior Council in 2006. As this summary is not exhaustive and may provide only one possible interpretation of the meaning of certain provisions in light of organizational development, for full details the relevant original documents should be consulted. Furthermore, due to gaps in the archives the sections on “Activation to Date” are in some cases based on external sources.

Human Dimension

The CSCE/OSCE has developed certain mechanisms and procedures that, in cases requiring rapid reaction, facilitate prompt and direct contact between the parties involved in a conflict, and help to mobilize concerted action by the OSCE. In practice, these have been used infrequently for various reasons, particularly since States acquired the option of raising such issues directly in the PC.

1. The Vienna Mechanism

The Vienna Mechanism, adopted at the Vienna Follow-up meeting in 1989, provides for the **exchange of information on questions relating to the human dimension**. It consists of four separate phases, where the participating States may:

- I. exchange information and respond to requests for information and to representations made to them by other participating States relating to the human dimension;¹
- II. hold bilateral meetings with other participating States that so request with a view to examining and resolving situations and specific cases relating to the human dimension;²
- III. notify all participating States of situations and cases in the human dimension (including those which have been raised in bilateral meetings described in paragraph II);
- IV. discuss the issues raised under the Mechanism, at the Review Conference,³ Human Dimension Implementation meetings, and meetings of the Senior Council-(nowadays the PC).

1.1. Activation to date

The Vienna Mechanism was activated extensively between January 1989 and April 1992. Since then it has rarely been invoked. Some examples:

1. The UK invoked the Vienna Mechanism in relation to human rights abuses in Romania, Czechoslovakia, the GDR and Bulgaria;

¹ Such communications may be forwarded through diplomatic channels or be addressed to any competent OSCE institution mandated in this sphere.

² The date and place of such meetings should be arranged by mutual agreement through diplomatic channels.

³ Review conferences (formerly called Follow-up Meetings) precede and prepare for Summits. The entire range of OSCE activities is examined, and steps that might be required to strengthen the OSCE are discussed.

2. Turkey invoked it in relation to Bulgaria over treatment of its Moslem population;
3. Hungary invoked it in relation to Romania over treatment of persons belonging to the Hungarian minority in Transylvania;
4. in 1991 it was used to draw attention to the civil war in Yugoslavia, and the military actions of Soviet forces in Lithuania;
5. in 1992 Austria invoked the Mechanism with respect to Turkey's treatment of its citizens of Kurdish descent in south eastern Turkey;
6. in 1992 the Russian Federation activated the exchange of information phase of the mechanism with regard to Estonian citizenship legislation.

2. The Moscow Mechanism

The Moscow Mechanism, adopted in 1991, **complements and strengthens the Vienna Mechanism**. While the Vienna Mechanism allows for inquiries into participating States human rights records, the Moscow Mechanism allows for independent experts to examine human dimension problems in participating States. It includes three procedures that are directly linked to it:

- the establishment of a **resource list**, comprising up to six experts appointed by each participating State, for a period of three to six years.⁴
- after a request for information, or for a bilateral meeting, under the Vienna Mechanism, the requesting State may suggest that the other State should invite a **mission of experts** (up to three, from the resource list, excluding nationals of the inviting State) to “address a particular clearly defined question on its territory related to the human dimension”. Such a mission may gather information that is necessary for carrying out its tasks and, if appropriate, use its good offices and mediation services to promote dialogue and co-operation among interested parties. According to the State concerned, the mission could be tasked to carry out further functions, such as, *inter alia*, fact-finding and advisory services. Within three weeks after its establishment, the mission should submit its observations to the inviting State. The latter (i.e. the inviting State) is requested to transmit, via the ODIHR, to the participating States the observations of the mission and a description of any action it has undertaken or intends to take upon it, no later than two weeks after the submission of the observations. The observations and comments submitted by the inviting State may be discussed in the PC which may consider any possible follow-up action.
- if the State refuses to establish a mission of experts within ten days, or if the requesting State judges that the issue in question has not been resolved, the requesting State may initiate the establishment of a **mission of rapporteurs** (up to three, from the resource list).⁵ A participating State with the support of at least five other participating States may initiate such a mission, and the consent of the requested state is not necessary. The rapporteurs should establish facts, report on them and give advice on possible solutions to the questions raised. The mission should then submit its report to the participating States or States concerned two weeks after the last rapporteur has been appointed. The requested State, unless the States concerned agree otherwise, is required to transmit its observations to the ODIHR no later than two weeks after the

⁴ The list is established and managed by the ODIHR (the designated institution) and can be downloaded from the internet at: http://www.osce.org/documents/odihhr/2003/09/2004_en.pdf. The experts should be eminent persons, including where possible experts with experience related to national minority issues.

⁵ Such a decision should be communicated to the ODIHR, which will notify without delay the State concerned as well as the other participating States.

submission of the report. The participating State or States that have requested the establishment of a mission of experts or rapporteurs have to cover the expenses of that mission.⁶

In addition to the above, the Moscow Mechanism also contains the provisions on the voluntary invitation of a mission of experts by an OSCE participating State as well as the establishment of an “emergency” mission of rapporteurs in cases of “a particularly serious threat” to the fulfilment of human dimension provisions.⁷ These can be considered to be new procedures in the human dimension in the sense that they are not directly linked to the provisions of the Vienna Mechanism.

2.1. Activation to date

As opposed to the Vienna Mechanism, the Moscow Mechanism has only been used five times to date:

1. in September 1992 a mission of rapporteurs was sent to Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, under the so-called “emergency procedures” concerning reported attacks on civilians. The mission was requested by the UK (with the support of Denmark, Ireland, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United States);
2. in December 1992 Estonia agreed to invite a mission of experts to study Estonia’s citizenship law and language legislation and its implementation;
3. in January 1993 Moldova invited a mission of experts to study the implementation of legislation related to rights of persons belonging to national minorities and inter-ethnic relations;
4. in June 1993 the Mechanism was invoked by the CSCE Committee of Senior Officials (i.e. the predecessor of the Senior Council) vis-à-vis Serbia-Montenegro, to investigate reports of human rights violations (this mission was unable to fulfill its task because of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's (FRY) lack of co-operation);
5. in December 2002, after a request by 10 OSCE participating States (Austria, Canada, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Norway, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Sweden), a fact finding mission was sent to Turkmenistan to examine concerns arising out of investigations resulting from the reported attack on 25 November 2002 on President Niyazov and to investigate all matters relating to the conduct of the investigation (December 2002 - March 2003).

There have also been a number of failed attempts to activate this mechanism, e.g. Russia in regard to Estonia in 1992; Austria in regard to Turkey in 1992; a decision by the Committee of Senior Officials in regard to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 1993; the Nordic countries in regard to Turkey in 1994; and the case of Turkmenistan in 2004 which was constrained by the refusal of the State concerned to grant an entry visa to the leader of the mission of experts.

⁶ In case of the appointment of experts or rapporteurs pursuant to a decision of the PC, the expenses will be covered by the participating States in accordance with the usual scale of distribution of expenses.

⁷ If at least ten OSCE participating States agree thereto.

Mechanisms for Risk Reduction

A number of specific early warning mechanisms for reducing the risk of conflict were adopted after 1989, reflecting a greater willingness of participating States to co-operate. In addition, the establishment of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) in 1992 and the Permanent Committee in 1993 (that was replaced in 1995 by the Permanent Council) greatly strengthened OSCE capabilities for early warning and conflict prevention. OSCE participating States now use these regular forums to draw the attention of the OSCE to potential crises.

Mechanisms for Risk Reduction developed in the course of the negotiations in the **framework of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) and Disarmament in Europe** were for the first time set forth in the Vienna Document 1990.⁸ All its further gradual modernisation resulted in the present version contained in the **Vienna Document 1999** (VD 99), Chapter III “Risk Reduction.”

They include:

- the mechanism for consultation and co-operation regarding unusual military activities;
- voluntary hosting of visits to dispel concern about military activities; and
- co-operation regarding hazardous incidents of a military nature.

3. Consultation and co-operation regarding unusual military activities

The mechanism for consultation and co-operation regarding unusual military activities is a special instrument of crisis prevention in the event of a threat posed by the employment of armed forces. For this purpose, the VD 99 stipulates that States, whose armed forces are being employed in unusual and unscheduled activities outside their normal peacetime locations which are militarily significant, agree to a consultation mechanism. This consultation mechanism is triggered by a participating State's request for an explanation of the activity by the other State that is a subject of security concerns. The reply to the request has to be transmitted within 48 hours. The request and the reply will be transmitted to all other participating States without delay.

In the second phase of this mechanism, the requesting and the responding States are entitled to ask other interested participating States, in particular those which have also expressed concern or might be involved in the activity, to participate in the meeting that would be chaired by the OSCE's Chairman-in-Office (CiO) (or his/her representative). Such a meeting should be convened within not more than 48 hours and should be held at a venue to be mutually agreed upon. If there is no agreement, the meeting ought to be held at the CPC. Should the matter not be clarified or settled at this meeting, one of the States directly involved has the right (in the third and final phase) to request a meeting of all participating

⁸ As a supplement to the arrangements for Risk Reduction, as well as to supplement and enhance the capabilities outlined in Chapter III of the Helsinki Document 1992, the participating States adopted in 1993 a catalogue of Stabilising Measures for Localised Crisis Situations. The catalogue is intended to facilitate decision making in the appropriate OSCE bodies, and the search for specific measures for temporary application in support of the political process. It does not commit any participating State to agree to the adoption of any of the measures. However, it does indicate the readiness of the participating States to explore in good faith their applicability in a specific situation.

States. In this case, the CiO (or his/her representative) should, within 48 hours, convene a meeting. The **PC and the FSC jointly would serve as the forum** for such a meeting. The task of these two OSCE bodies **would be to jointly assess the situation** and to recommend appropriate measures for stabilising the situation and halting activities that give rise to security concerns.

3.1. Activation to date

In practice, this mechanism has been activated only on a few occasions:

1. in June 1991, Italy invoked it in response to FRY military activities near the Italian border;
2. in July 1991, Austria called for a meeting to consider FRY military activities near the Austrian border and in Austrian airspace;
3. in August 1991, Hungary invoked the mechanism asking the FRY Government for information on overflights of Hungarian territory.

4. Voluntary hosting of visits

Voluntary hosting of visits is another option in order to help dispel concerns about military activities. This mechanism envisages that a State, which is conducting such a military activity, takes the initiative and invites other participating States, especially those which are understood to have concerns, to visit the areas on the territory of the host State where the activity is taking place. At the time such invitations are issued, the host State should communicate to all other participating States its intention to conduct the visit, indicating the reasons for the visit, the area to be visited, the States invited and the general arrangements to be adopted. Arrangements for visits are at the discretion of the host State. The VD 99 contains provisions with regard to modalities and programme of such visits.

4.1. Activation to date

So far, this mechanism has never been activated.

5. Measures regarding hazardous incidents of a military nature

The **VD 99** also contains co-operative measures regarding **hazardous incidents of a military nature on the territory of a participating State** in order to prevent possible misunderstandings and mitigate the effects on another participating State. In case of such hazardous incidents, points of contact have been established by each participating State. Through them each participating State can inform other participating States about such an incident and provide explanations in an expeditious manner. Any participating State affected by such an incident may also request clarification as appropriate. Matters related to such issues may be discussed by participating States in the FSC or at the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting.

5.1. Activation to date

These measures were invoked in January 1992, by Portugal on behalf of the EC in the wake of the downing of a helicopter carrying EC monitors over Yugoslav territory.

6. Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations

Besides the development of the Vienna Document and in view of the OSCE's role in conflict prevention, crisis management and peaceful settlement of disputes, it has been acknowledged

that specific *militarily significant* stabilizing measures may be required for application in localized crisis situations to support the political process of crisis resolution.

For this purpose, the FSC adopted in November 1993, under the Programme for Immediate Action, a document on Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations. The document outlines a catalogue of stabilizing measures intended to facilitate decision making in appropriate OSCE bodies and the search for specific measures for temporary application in support of the political process during crisis situations. The stabilizing measures may be applied individually or in various combinations, depending on circumstances. The measures apply when participating States decide to activate them and the exact measures to be taken are also decided by the participating States themselves. However, the catalogue does not commit any participating State to agree to the adoption of any of the measures contained therein in a given situation. Furthermore, their application require the prior consent and active support of the parties involved in a particular crisis situation.

6.1. Activation to date

So far, this measure has not been activated.

7. Fostering the Role of the OSCE as a Forum for Political Dialogue

Another measure for risk reduction was adopted at the Ministerial Council in Bucharest in 2001. Ministerial Council Decision No 3, entitled "Fostering the Role of the OSCE as a forum for political dialogue" contains a specific paragraph (para 8) on improving the dialogue of the Organization through further inclusion of the FSC. According to the decision, the FSC, as the OSCE body for reviewing the implementation of OSCE commitments in the fields of arms control and CSBMs and for negotiating measures in these fields, should - while retaining its autonomy and decision making capacity - be more closely connected with the overall OSCE work on current security issues.

To this end, it was decided that the FSC would make available its expert advice on issues of a politico military nature, at the request of the PC. An example of this provided in the decision was advice on politico military issues of OSCE field operations in accordance with their respective mandates. It was also noted that the FSC could advise the PC or the CiO on its own initiative. The wording of this decision could be interpreted to mean that the FSC could be tasked by the PC to engage or to initiate an expert mission in a case of emergency.

7.1. Activation to date

So far, this measure has not been activated.

Early warning

Most early warning and preventative action mechanisms are based on political dialogue within the structures and institutions of the Organization. The **establishment of the Permanent Council has consequently strengthened OSCE capabilities for early warning**, as OSCE participating States can now use this forum to draw the attention of the OSCE to potential crisis situations at any given moment.

8. Provisions relating to early warning and preventive action

The provisions related to early warning situations within the OSCE area, which have the potential to develop into crises, including armed conflicts, date back to the Helsinki Document (1992). According to them, the participating States should make use of regular, in-depth consultations, within the structures and institutions of the OSCE. Furthermore, participating States have the right to draw the attention of the PC (originally the Committee of Senior Officials) to a given situation. This can be done through the CiO, *inter alia*, by:

- any participating State directly involved in a dispute;
- a group of 11 participating States not directly involved in the dispute;
- the High Commissioner on National Minorities in situations he/she deems escalating into a conflict or exceeding the scope of his/her action;
- the FSC (originally the Consultative Committee of the CPC) following the use of the mechanism for consultations and co-operation as regards unusual military activities;
- the use of the Human Dimension Mechanism or the Valletta Principles for Dispute Settlement and Provisions for a CSCE Procedure for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes.

9. The Berlin Mechanism

As in the case of the provisions relating to early warning and preventive action, **the establishment of the PC allows the OSCE to deal with emergency situations practically at any time without formally triggering the Berlin Mechanism.** However, the Berlin Mechanism, which was adopted in June 1991 at the Berlin Meeting of the CSCE Council and amended by the Summit in Budapest in 1994, outlines measures that can be applied in the case of serious emergency situations that may arise from a violation of one of the Principles of the Helsinki Final Act or as the result of major disruptions endangering peace, security or stability. It foresees that, if any participating State concludes that such an emergency situation is developing, it may seek clarification from the State or the States involved. The requested State or States should provide within 48 hours all relevant information in order to clarify the situation. Should the situation remain unresolved any participating State involved in the procedure may request the CiO to call an Emergency Meeting of the PC.

9.1. Activation to date

The Berlin Mechanism has only been used on a few occasions:

1. in 1991 the USA, Austria, Hungary and the WEU countries called for an emergency meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials in response to the eruption of the full-scale conflict in Yugoslavia. Seven additional meetings were eventually held;
2. in 1993 Azerbaijan (supported by 17 participating States) requested an emergency meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials in regard to the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh;

In 1993 Hungary tried to have an Emergency Meeting regarding the Gabcikovo Dam on the Danube, but failed to gain the required support necessary.⁹

10. Measures in the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons

The OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) adopted in 2000, sets measures to counter the destabilizing accumulation and uncontrolled spread of small arms within the Organization's wider efforts in early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management. Each participating State may raise within the OSCE at the Forum for Security

⁹ Until the Budapest Summit in 1994 it was necessary for 12 states to declare their support for the mechanism to activate a meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials (nowadays the PC).

Co-operation or the Permanent Council its concerns about such accumulations or spreads and request clarification. Furthermore, a participating State can request in the FSC framework assistance in addressing problems related to accumulation or spread of SALW and invite other participating States to make available individuals with relevant expertise in small arms issues. In response to recommendations from the appointed experts, the Permanent Council should consider a range of measures including: assistance on security and management of stockpiles of SALW; assistance with reduction and disposal of SALW; provision of advice or mutual assistance to implement and reinforce border controls to reduce illicit SALW trafficking; and assistance with SALW collection and control programmes.

10.1 Activation to date

To date, this mechanism has been used on many occasions by participating States requiring assistance in destruction and stockpile management of small arms as well as regarding clarifications on SALW transfers.

Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

11. The Valletta Mechanism

Created at a meeting of experts in January 1991, and adopted at the Berlin Ministerial Council in 1991, the **Valletta Mechanism was the first formal CSCE procedure for peaceful settlement of disputes**. The Valetta Mechanism was slightly revised and simplified at the Ministerial Council in Stockholm in 1992. The Mechanism outlines provisions aimed at facilitating peaceful settlement of disputes between participating States. It foresees an initial stage to help parties select an adequate procedure rather than immediately look into the substance of the dispute and contains specific and broad escape clauses.

If the parties are unable, within a reasonable period of time, in light of all circumstances of the dispute, to settle the dispute in direct consultation or negotiation, or to agree upon an appropriate procedure for settling the dispute, any party to the dispute may request the establishment of a OSCE Dispute Settlement Mechanism by notifying the other party or parties to the dispute. The Mechanism consists of one or more persons, selected from a register of qualified candidates and nominated by the Director of the CPC, and tasked to seek contact with the parties to the dispute, separately or jointly.¹⁰ They may offer general or specific comments or advice, that may be confidential and that does not bind the parties. The Mechanism may also use, if the parties so agree, the premises and facilities of the International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The parties to a dispute may at any time, by mutual agreement, modify or adapt the above-mentioned procedure.

The Valetta Mechanism is commonly considered to be a rather complicated and multiphase political construction. The Mechanism has, so far, never been used.

¹⁰ If the parties to the dispute have not reached agreement on the composition of a Mechanism within three months from the initial request, the Director of the CPC should, in consultation with the parties to the dispute, select from the register a number of names, no more than five. Each party to the dispute has the right to reject up to three of the nominees. After one month from the date of informing the parties of the nomination, the CPC should notify the parties of the composition of the Mechanism.

11.1 Provisions for Direct Conciliation

In addition to the above, at the Stockholm Ministerial Council in December 1992, the participating States also adopted a modification of the Valletta Mechanism. Under these provisions the Ministerial Council or the Senior Council,¹¹ were also given the authority to instruct any two participating States to seek conciliation to assist them in resolving a dispute that they have not been able to settle within a reasonable period of time and adopted related provisions – regardless of whether or not the participating States object to the decision. This procedure is also referred to as “consensus minus two”. So far, this option has not been put into practice.

12. The Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the OSCE

The 1992 Ministerial Council in Stockholm adopted the Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration. The Convention binds only those participating States that have legally become part to it and that also cover the expenses of the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, which was established with the aim of facilitating the settlement of disputes between States parties, through conciliation and, where appropriate, arbitration.

The Convention provides for the establishment of a **Court of Conciliation and Arbitration** composed of Conciliation Commissions and Arbitral Tribunals **with headquarters in Geneva**. The Court is not a permanent body, but a roster of conciliators and arbitrators¹² - only when a dispute is submitted to it would an *ad hoc* Conciliation Commission or an *ad hoc* Arbitral Tribunal be established. The Conciliation Commission would hear cases brought before it by the common consent of two or more States and should present a report to the parties, proposing a solution to the dispute. The recommendations of the Conciliation Commission are not binding. If no agreement would be reached within a period of thirty days, an Arbitral Tribunal can be constituted. However, this is optional and should not be brought into play without the agreement of both parties to the dispute. The decisions of the Tribunal are binding on the parties that have agreed to submit the Commission’s report to arbitration.

So far, only 33 of the participating States have signed and ratified/acceded to the Convention and although it came into force in December 1994, the Convention has so far not been used.

¹¹ Now this would be the PC.

¹² Nominated by the parties to the Convention.

CSCE/OSCE Forums for Permanent Consultation:

The *CSCE Council* was established in 1990 consisting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs. In 1994 it became the *Ministerial Council*.

The Committee of Senior Officials (CSO)

In effect the CSO was the CSCE's regular consultative body from 1990 to 1992.



The Senior Council (SC)

When the CSCE was renamed to the OSCE in 1994 the *Committee of Senior Officials* became the *Senior Council*. In the following years, the role of the *Senior Council* became increasingly limited. In 2006, the *Senior Council* was officially dissolved and most of its functions were transferred to the *Permanent Council (PC)*.

The Vienna Group of the Committee of Senior Officials

When the CSCE became involved in conflict prevention and crisis management in the 1990s the need for a permanent body for consultations on day-to-day operational matters arose. Taking advantage of the permanent presence in Vienna of State representatives involved in arms negotiations, a *Vienna Group of the Committee of Senior Officials* was formed.

This *Vienna Group of the CSO* was institutionalized as the *Permanent Committee* in 1993.

When the *Consultative Committee of the Conflict Prevention Centre* (which was established by the Paris Charter in 1990) was dissolved in 1993 it was decided to transfer its competence to the *Permanent Committee* and the *Forum for Security Co-operation*.



The Permanent Committee

The *Permanent Committee* was formed in 1993. As time went on the *Permanent Committee* increasingly took over the functions of the *Committee of Senior Officials*, to which it was responsible.



The Permanent Council (PC)

The PC was established in 1995 and has in practise been the OSCE's regular body for decision-making since then.

The Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC)

The FSC was created in 1992 and originally consisted of the *Consultative Committee of the Conflict Prevention Centre* and a *Special Committee*. In 1993, when it was decided to move the CSCE Secretariat to Vienna, the *Consultative Committee* was dissolved and its role was taken over by the *Special Committee*. In 1994 the mandate of the FSC was reviewed and expanded.

Reference Documents

1. *Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting*, section on *Human Dimension of the CSCE*, paragraphs 1- 4, Vienna 1986-1989.
2. *Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE*, Chapter 1, paragraphs 1-16, Moscow 1991.
3. *Decisions of the Rome Council Meeting*, Annex A, Rome 1993.
4. *FSC Journal No. 49, Annex 2*, Rome, 24 November 1993.
5. *Helsinki Document 1992*, Chapter 3, paragraphs 3-5.
6. *Vienna Document 1999*, paragraphs 16, 17.3.
7. *Stabilising Measures for Localised Crisis Situations*, DOC.FSC/2/96, 25 November 1993.
8. *Provision for a CSCE procedure for peaceful settlement of disputes, Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes*, Section V- XVI, Valletta 1991.
9. *Summary of Conclusions* from the Berlin Council Meeting, Annex 2, Berlin 1991.
10. *Summary of Conclusions* from the Stockholm Council Meeting, *Decision on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes*, Annex 1, Stockholm 1992.
11. *Summary of Conclusions* from the Stockholm Council Meeting, *Decision on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes*, Annex 2, Stockholm 1992.
12. *Summary of Conclusions* from the Stockholm Council Meeting, *Decision on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes*, Annex 3, Stockholm 1992.
13. *Summary of Conclusion* from the Stockholm Council Meeting, *Decision on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes*, Annex 4, Stockholm 1992.
14. *Ninth Meeting of the Ministerial Council, Bucharest 2001*, Ministerial Council Decision No 3, *Fostering the Role of the OSCE as a Forum for Political Dialogue*.

OSCE MECHANISMS & MEASURES FOR EARLY WARNING, CONFLICT PREVENTION & CRISIS MANAGEMENT — II A

<i>Name of OSCE Mechanism or Measure</i>	Vienna Document 1990-1999 (VD) Unusual Military Activities (UMA) Mechanism	VD Measure on Hazardous Incidents of a Military Nature	VD Measure on Voluntary Hosting of Visits to Dispel Concerns About Military Activities	Berlin 1991 Emergency Meeting (EM) Mechanism	Helsinki 1992 Early Warning (EW) Mechanism	Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (2000)
<i>No. of states or structures required to invoke</i>	1	1	1	1 + 12	1 or 11 or HCNM or PC	1
<i>Purpose</i>	Clarify facts Moral suasion Confidence-building	Clarify facts Moral suasion Confidence-building	Clarify facts Confidence-building	Clarify facts Moral suasion Suggest solutions Authorize political steps	Clarify facts Moral suasion Suggest solutions Authorize political steps	Confidence-building Stabilize military context Provide assistance
<i>Primary locus of problem</i>	Intra-state Inter-state	Intra-state Inter-state	Intra-state Inter-state	Intra-state Inter-state	Intra-state Inter-state	Intra-state Inter-state

<i>Procedures & Timelines</i>	REQ seeks info from RCV on unusual military activity	<i>Day</i> 1	State whose forces are involved in hazardous military incident (RCV) informs other OSCE states expeditiously	<i>Day</i> 1	State may invite other OSCE states' reps to visit areas on territory of host state about which there may be concerns about military activities	<i>Day</i> 1	REQ seeks info from RCV on situation	<i>Day</i> 1	State involved in dispute requests CIO to raise issue with PC	<i>Day</i> 1	Sets measures to counter destabilizing accumulation and uncontrolled spread of small arms. Each pS may raise at the FSC or the PC its concerns about such accumulations or spreads and request clarification. A pS can also request assistance in addressing such problems.
	RCV responds to request	3				RCV responds to request	3	<i>OR</i>			
<i>ABBREVIATIONS:</i> <i>REQ: Requesting State</i> <i>RCV: Receiving State</i> <i>TBD: To be discussed</i>	Request & reply sent to all OSCE states	3	<i>AND/OR</i>	<i>TBD</i>	Arrangements for visits at discretion of host state	<i>TBD</i>	Request & reply sent to all OSCE states	3	11 OSCE states not involved in dispute request CIO to raise issue with PC	1	
	REQ seeks mtg with RCV; notifies all OSCE states about mtg; RCV may invite other OSCE states to attend	<i>TBD</i>	State affected by incident (REQ) requests clarification	<i>TBD</i>			REQ asks CIO to organize PC emergency meeting	4	<i>OR</i>		
	Mtg held of REQ & RCV (& other invited states), with assistance from CPC	<i>TBD</i> +2	RCV promptly replies to request for clarification	<i>TBD</i>			CIO informs all OSCE states, including states concerned	4-5	HCNM requests CIO to raise issue with PC	1	
	REQ & RCV send reports to all OSCE states	<i>w/o delay</i>	OSCE states may discuss at FSC, AIAM, or other agreed venue	<i>TBD</i>			12+ States second request to CIO	6	If agreed, CIO places on PC agenda in context of conflict prevention	<i>TBD</i>	<u>No states to invoke:</u> 1 <u>Purpose:</u> Foster FSC-PC dialogue, fact-finding, expert advise <u>Primary locus of problem:</u> Inter – state, Intra-state <u>Procedures and timeline:</u> Decides that the FSC makes available its expert advice on issues of a politico-military nature, at the request of the PC.
	REQ asks for PC mtg of all OSCE states	<i>TBD</i>					CIO notifies OSCE states of mtg date/agenda	6	PC may execute fact-finding & monitor missions, with assistance from CPC , or initiate other follow-up actions (e.g., Minsk Group)	<i>TBD</i>	
	PC mtg held	<i>TBD</i> +2					PC mtg opens	8-9			
	per Prague '92: PC may execute fact-finding & monitor missions, with assistance from CPC	<i>TBD</i>					PC mtg concludes	10-11			

OSCE MECHANISMS AND MEASURES FOR EARLY WARNING, CONFLICT PREVENTION & CRISIS MANAGEMENT — II B

	Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations (Transparency)	Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations (Constraints)	Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations (Confidence-reinforcing)	Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations (Monitoring)	Independent Action
<i>No. of states or structures required to invoke</i>	PC	PC	PC	PC	HCNM or CIO
<i>Purpose</i>	Stabilize military context Confidence-building Supplement & enhance OSCE political process	Stabilize military context Confidence-building Supplement & enhance OSCE political process	Stabilize military context Confidence-building Supplement & enhance OSCE political process	Stabilize military context Confidence-building Supplement & enhance OSCE political process	Enable rapid & flexible investigations, actions, & expressions of political will by OSCE states
<i>Primary locus of problem</i>	Intra-state Inter-state	Intra-state Inter-state	Intra-state Inter-state	Intra-state Inter-state	Intra-state Inter-state

<p><i>Procedures & Timelines</i></p> <hr/> <p><u>ABBREVIATIONS:</u></p> <p><u>REQ:</u> Requesting State</p> <p><u>RCV:</u> Receiving State</p> <p><u>TBD:</u> To be discussed</p> <hr/>	<p>Decision of appropriate OSCE body seized with crisis (based on consensus & with prior consent & active support of parties involved) to select & apply specific measures</p>	<u>Day</u> 1	<p>Decision of appropriate OSCE body seized with crisis (based on consensus & with prior consent & active support of parties involved) to select & apply specific measures</p>	<u>Day</u> 1	<p>Decision of appropriate OSCE body seized with crisis (based on consensus & with prior consent & active support of parties involved) to select & apply specific measures</p>	<u>Day</u> 1	<p>Decision of appropriate OSCE body seized with crisis (based on consensus & with prior consent & active support of parties involved) to select & apply specific measures</p>	<u>Day</u> 1	<p>HCNM: Independent action for "conflict prevention at the earliest possible stage" (mandate per Helsinki Doc, Chapter II)</p> <p>CIO: Independent action through statements, visits, personal involvement in disputes, use of ad hoc steering groups or appointment of personal representatives (per Helsinki Doc, Chapters I & III); Assistance to be provided by troika, as appropriate</p> <p>Other: The establishment of the PC has strengthened OSCE capabilities for early warning, as OSCE participating States can now use this forum to draw the attention of the OSCE to potential crisis situations at any given moment</p>	<u>Day</u> 1
	<p>Modalities determined by appropriate OSCE authority</p> <p>Catalogue of possible transparency measures includes (but is not limited to):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Extraordinary information exchange — Notification of certain military activities — Notification of plans for acquisition & deployment of major weapon & equipment systems 	TBD	<p>Modalities determined by appropriate OSCE authority</p> <p>Catalogue of possible constraint measures includes (but is not limited to):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Introduction & support of cease-fire — Establishment of demilitarized zones — Cessation of military flights — Deactivation of certain weapon systems — Treatment of irregular forces — Constraints on certain military activities 	TBD	<p>Modalities determined by appropriate OSCE authority</p> <p>Catalogue of possible confidence-reinforcing measures includes (but is not limited to):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Public statements on matters relevant to a particular crisis situation — Observation of certain military activities — Liaison teams — Establishment of direct lines of communication — Joint expert teams in support of crisis management — Joint coordination commissions or teams 	TBD	<p>Modalities determined by appropriate OSCE authority</p> <p>Catalogue of possible monitoring measures includes (but is not limited to):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> — Evaluation of data provided under extraordinary information exchange — Inspections — Observation of compliance with demilitarized zones — Verification of heavy weapons — Challenge inspections — Aerial observation regime 	TBD	<p>HCNM: Independent action for "conflict prevention at the earliest possible stage" (mandate per Helsinki Doc, Chapter II)</p> <p>CIO: Independent action through statements, visits, personal involvement in disputes, use of ad hoc steering groups or appointment of personal representatives (per Helsinki Doc, Chapters I & III); Assistance to be provided by troika, as appropriate</p> <p>Other: The establishment of the PC has strengthened OSCE capabilities for early warning, as OSCE participating States can now use this forum to draw the attention of the OSCE to potential crisis situations at any given moment</p>	1